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Stubborn and Rebellious Children: Liability of 
Public Officials for Detention of Children in 
Jails? 
Mark Soler 
Michael J. Dale 
Kathleen Flake* 
t Stubborn children, runaways, common night walkers, both male and female, 
common railers and brawlers, persons who with offensive and disorderly act or 
language accost or annoy persons of the opposite sex, lewd, wanton and 
lascivious persons in speech or behavior, idle and disorderly persons, 
prostitutes, disturbers of the peace, keepers of noisy and disorderly houses and 
persons guilty of indecent exposure may be punished by imprisonment in a 
house of correction for not more than six months or by a fine of not more than 
two hundred dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
Mass. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, $! 53 (West 1970) (amended 1973). 
If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, which will not obey the voice of 
his father, or the voice of his mother, and that, when they have chastened him, 
will not hearken unto them; then shall his father and his mother lay hold on 
him, and bring him out unto the elders of his city, and unto the gate of his 
place; and they shall say unto the elders of his city, This our son is stubborn 
and rebellious, he will not obey our voice; he is a glutton, and a drunkard. And 
all the men of his city shall stone him with stones, that he die; so shalt thou 
put evil away from among you; and all Isreal shall hear, and fear. 
Deuteronomy 21:18-21 (King James). 
* Mark Soler is director and Michael J. Dale is former director of the Juvenile Jus- 
tice Legal Advocacy Project, a project of the Youth Law Center, San Francisco, Califor- 
nia. Kathleen Flake, a graduate of the University of Utah College of Law, has worked 
with the Project as a legal intern. 
The Juvenile Justice Legal Advocacy Project is a public interest law project operat- 
ing under a grant from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
(OJJDP) of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States De- 
partment of Justice. The project provides a comprehensive range of legal advocacy ser- 
vices to national and local advocate organizations working to implement the Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. $8 5601-5751 (1976). The 
project also provides back-up support to local attorneys who are engaged in youth advo- 
cacy work, and provides direct legal assistance in the form of legislative, administrative 
and litigant advocacy. 
This article was prepared under Grant #78-JS-AX-0073 from the Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. 
Department of Justice. A portion of this article is based upon research and pleadings 
done by attorneys at the National Juvenile Law Center in Saint Louis, Missouri. Points 
of view or opinions in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily re- 
present the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
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Each year thousands of children are confined in adult jails 
throughout the United States. Although the exact number of 
children confined is difficult to determine, some authorities 
place the figure as high as 500,000 per year.' In 1970, a limited 
survey by the National Jail Census reported that on March 15, 
1970, some 7,800 children were confined in adult jails in the 
United States? 
The massive confinement of children in adult jails is a long- 
standing practice. In 1869, for example, investigators for the Illi- 
nois Board of State Commissioners of Public Charities inspected 
seventy-eight jails in Illinois. They found 511 inmates, ninety- 
eight of whom were children under the age of sixteen? They de- 
scribed the Cook County jail as follows: 
The jail is so dark that is is necessary to keep the gas burning 
in the corridors both day and night. The cells are filthy and 
full of vermin . . . this effort of promiscuous herding together 
of old and young, innocent and guilty, convicts, suspected per- 
sons and witnesses, male and female, is to make the county 
prison a school of vice. In such an atmosphere purity itself 
could not escape ~ontamination.~ 
More than 100 years later, a federal judge made similar ob- 
servations concerning the conditions in the jail in Lucas County, 
Ohio: 
[Wlhen the total picture of confinement in the Lucas County 
Jail is examined, what appears is confinement in cramped and 
overcrowded quarters, lightless, airless, damp and filthy with 
leaking water and human wastes, slow starvation, deprivation 
of most human contacts, except with others in the same sub- 
human state, no exercise or recreation, little if any medical at- 
tention, no attempt at rehabilitation, and for those who in de- 
spair or frustration lash out at  their surroundings, confine- 
1. R. SARRI, UNDER LOCK AND KEY, JUVENILES IN JAILS AND DETENTION 5 (1974). 
2. The survey was limited to locally administered jails with authority to confine per- 
sons for 48 hours or more. The survey did not include federal and state prisons or other 
correctional institutions; jails in Connecticut, Delaware, and Rhode Island (where jails 
are administered by state, not local, authorities); and drunk tanks and lockups that de- 
tain individuals for fewer than 48 hours. NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AND 
STATISTICS ERVICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS- 
ncE, 1970 NATIONAL JAIL CENSUS, A REPORT ON THE NATION'S LOCAL JAILS AND TYPES OF 
INMATES 1(1971). 
3. A. F'LATT, THE CHILD SAYERS 118 (2d ed. 1977). 
4. Id. at 119. 
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ment, stripped of clothing and every last vestige of humanity, 
in a sort of oubliette.= 
As in other states: detention of juveniles in adult jails is 
illegal in Utah. State law generally requires that juveniles be de- 
tained in facilities separate and distinct from adult jails.' 
In addition, the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act8 requires states to develop state plans for imple- 
mentation of the Act which will ensure that juveniles who are 
5. Baker v. Hamilton, 345 F. Supp. 345,352 (W.D. Ky. 1972) (quoting Jones v. Wit- 
tenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 99 (N.D. Ohio 1971). 
6. Attorneys for the Juvenile Justice Legal Advocacy Project focus their work pri- 
marily on six states: Colorado, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Utah, and Wash- 
ington. The laws in these six states differ somewhat in terms of statutory liability and 
immunity of public officials. These differences are representative of those among other 
states. In this Article, the text will focus on Utah law, with references to the laws of the 
other states for comparative purposes. 
7. The Utah Juvenile Court Act, UTAH CODE ANN. 78-3a-30(3) (1953), specifically 
provides: 
No child under the age of 16 may be confined in a jail, lockup or other place 
for adult detention. The provisions of section 55-10-49 remain in full force and 
effect. . . . 
Section 55-1 la-1 provides: 
Children under the age of sixteen years, who are apprehended by any officer or 
are brought before any court for examination under any of the provisions of 
this chapter, shall not be confined in the jails, lockups or police cells used for 
ordinary criminals or persons charged with crime nor shall they be confined in 
the state youth development center. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-lla-1 (Supp. 1979) (previously designated 55-10-49). 
The State of Washington prohibits the detention of any child under 16 years of age 
in a jail, lockup, or police station. The child may be held in a detention facility separate 
from a jail. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. $ 13.04.115 (1962). 
The basic rule in Colorado is that children under the age of 14 may not be held in 
jails used for the confinement of adults. Children over the age of 14 may not be held in 
jails used for adults except pursuant to court order. The exception may be invoked only 
where "no other suitable place of confinement is available." COLO. REV. STAT. 19-2- 
lO3(6) (a) (1978). 
In New Mexico, the Children's Code states that no child alleged to be in need of 
supervision or neglected may be held in jail. N.M. STAT. ANN. 32-1-25 (E) (1978). Al- 
leged juvenile delinquents may only be held in jail "in a room totally separate and re- 
moved from incarcerated adults." Id. § 32-1-25(C). 
North Carolina's current statute provides that, until 1983, alleged status offenders 
and delinquents may be held in jails with holdover facilities for juveniles as long as there 
is both sight and sound separation from adults. N.C. GEN. STAT. $ 7A-576 (Supp. 1979). 
After this date no children can be held in detention in jails. Id. § 7A-576(c). 
Unlike the other states cited, Oregon allows all classes of juveniles-dependent, sta- 
tus offenders, and delinquents-14 years of age or over to be placed in an adult deten- 
tion facility in a separate room screened from sight and sound of adult detainees under 
circumstances where a suitable juvenile detention facility is not available. OR. REV. STAT. 
419.575 (1977). 
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5751 (1976). 
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charged with or have committed offenses that would not be 
criminal if committed by an adult (status offenders), and such 
nonoffenders as dependent and neglected children, are not 
placed in secure facilities at all.@ These plans must also provide 
that juveniles alleged or found to be delinquent, status offend- 
ers, or nonoffenders may not be detained in any institution or 
facility where they have regular contact with adults charged 
with or convicted of crimes.1° 
Despite these clear mandates, substantial numbers of 
juveniles are regularly detained in adult jails in Utah. In July, 
1976, the John Howard Association estimated that more than 
1,100 juveniles had been detained in Utah adult jails during the 
previous year." A thirty day survey by the Community Research 
Forum in 1979 confirmed that, at least in rural areas, juveniles 
continue to be detained in adult jails on a regular basis.12 
This Article will discuss the nature and extent of the legal 
liability local and state officials in Utah may incur for detaining 
juveniles in adult jails. For purposes of comparison, reference 
will be made to five other states? This Article will specifically 
9. Id. 5 5633(a)(12). 
10. Id. 5 5633(a)(13). In addition, the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. 
45 5031-5037 (1976), which applies to juveniles prosecuted in federal courts, provides: 
A juvenile alleged to be delinquent may be detained only in a juvenile facility 
or such other suitable place as the Attorney General may designate. Whenever 
possible, detention shall be in a foster home or cummunity based facility lo- 
cated in or near his home community. The Attorney General shall not came 
any juvenile alleged to be delinquent to be detained or confined in any insti- 
tution in which the juvenile has regular contact with adult persons convicted 
of a crime or waiting trial on criminal charges. Insofar as possible, alleged 
delinquents shall be kept separate from adjudicated delinquents. Every juve- 
nile in custody shall be provided with adequate food, heat, light, sanitary facil- 
ities, bedding, clothing, recreation, education, and medical care, including nec- 
essary psychiatric, psychological, or other care and treatment. 
Id. 5 5035 (emphasis added). 
11. JOHN HOWARD ASSOCIATION, UNIFIED CORRECTIONS STUDY OF STATE OF UTAH: FI- 
NAL REPORT. A STUDY FOR THE SOCIAL SERVICES STUDY COMMITTEE OF THE LEGISLATURE OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 88 (1976). In 1977 in Colorado, 4,541 juveniles were held in jails. Of 
this number, 3,318 were held in jails lacking adequate separation from adults. DIVISION 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STATE OF COLORADO, 1980 JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PRE- 
VENTION PLAN 383 (1979). In 1977 in North Carolina, 2,644 juveniles were held in adult 
jails. An additional 4,002 were held in juvenile detention facilities. JUVENILE CODE REVI- 
SION COMMIT~EE, 1979 REPORT, 374-75 (1979). 
12. COMMUNITY RESEARCH FORUM, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE UTAH STATE JUVE- 
NILE JUSTICE ADVISORY GROUP: REMOVAL OF JUVENILES FROM ADULT JAILS IN RURAL UTAH 
(1979). 
13. These states are Colorado, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, and Washing- 
ton. See note 6 supra. 
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discuss the injuries suffered by children detained in adult jails, 
the bases for liability under state and federal law of local and 
state officials who have legal responsibility for juveniles detained 
in jails, and the immunity and indemnification provisions appli- 
cable to such local and state officials. Finally, this Article will 
summarize the relevant public policy considerations and draw 
conclusions as to the liability of local and state officials who ille- 
gally detain juveniles in adult jails. 
Virtually every national organization concerned with law en- 
forcement and the judicial system-including the American Bar 
Association, the Institute for Judicial Administration, the Na- 
tional Advisory Commission on Law Enforcement, the National 
Council on Crime and Delinquency, and the National Sheriffs' 
Association- has recommended standards that prohibit the jail- 
ing of children. This near unanimous censure of the jailing of 
children stems from the conclusion that such a practice harms 
the very persons the juvenile justice system is designed to pro- 
tect and assist. A Senate subcommittee concluded that 
"[r]egardless of the reasons that might be brought forth to jus- 
tify jailing juveniles, the practice is destructive for the child who 
is incarcerated and dangerous for the community that permits 
[it] ."I4 
Incarcerating children harms them in several ways. The 
most widely recognized harm is the physical and sexual abuse 
such children suffer at the hands of $adults in the same facility. 
The cases of assault and rape of jailed juveniles are too numer- 
ous to list and too common to be denied. Even short term or 
pretrial detention in an adult jail exposes male and female 
juveniles not only to sexual assault and exploitation but to phys- 
ical injury as well. One authority describes the plight of juveniles 
in some jails in the following terms: 
Most of the children in these jails have done nothing, yet they 
are subjected to the cruelest of abuses. They are confined in 
overcrowded facilities, forced to perform brutal exercise rou- 
tines, punished by beatings by staff and peers, put in isolation, 
and whipped. They have their heads held under water in toi- 
14. Detention and Jailing of Juveniles: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investi- 
gate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. 
(1973). 
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lets. They are raped by both s M  and peers, gassed in their 
cells, and sometimes stomped or beaten to death by adult pris- 
oners. A number of youths not killed by others end up killing 
themsel~es.'~ 
Often local officials isolate the child from contact with 
others in an attempt to protect him from attack by adult detain- 
ees. However, such well-meaning measures may themselves be 
harmful to the child. Dr. Joseph R. Noshpitz, past president of 
the American Association for Children's Residential Centers and 
Secretary of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry, has 
noted that placing juveniles in jail often causes serious emo- 
tional distress and even illness: 
[Elxtended isolation of a youngster exposes him to conditions 
equivalent to "sensory deprivation.'' This is a state of affairs 
which will cause a normal adult to begin experiencing psychot- 
ic-like symptoms, and will push a troubled person in the direc- 
tion of serious emotional illness. 
What is true in this case for adults is of even greater con- 
cern with children and adolescents. Youngsters are in general 
more vulnerable to emotional pressure than mature adults; iso- 
lation is a condition of extraordinarily severe phychic stress; 
the resultant impact on the mental health of the individual ex- 
posed to such stress will always be serious, and can occasion- 
ally be disastrous.16 
Jails that were constructed to accommodate adults who 
have committed criminal acts cannot provide an environment 
suitable for the care and detention of delinquents or status of- 
fenders. Adult detention facilities do not take into account the 
child's perception of time and space or his naivete regarding the 
purpose and duration of his stay in a locked facility. The lack of 
sensory stimuli, extended periods of absolute silence or out- 
breaks of hostility, foul odors and public commodes, as well as 
inactivity and empty time constitute an intolerable environment 
for a child. 
The juvenile offender confined with adults is exposed to a 
society that encourages his delinquent behavior, schools him in 
sophisticated criminal techniques, and provides him with crimi- 
nal contacts. High recidivism rates belie the widespread belief 
15. BARTOLLAS & MILLER, ?kE JUVENILE OFFENDER: CONTROL, CORRECTION AND 
TREATMENT 212 (1978). 
16. Lollis v. New York Stat. Dep't of Social Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473,481 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970). 
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that the unpleasant experience of incarceration will have a 
deterrant effect on the child's future delinquent acts. To the 
contrary, "[ilf a youngster is made to feel like a prisoner, then 
he will soon begin to behave like a prisoner, assuming all the 
attributes and characteristics which he has learned from fellow 
inmates and from previous exposure to the media.'"' 
Being treated like a prisoner also reinforces the delinquent 
or truant child's negative self-image. It confirms what many de- 
linquent children already suspect about their lack of social ac- 
ceptance and self-worth. In its Standards and Guides for the 
Detention of Children and Youth, the National Council on 
Crime and Delinquency concluded: 
The case against the uie of jails for children rests upon the fact 
that youngsters of juvenile court age are still in the process of 
development and are still subject to change, however large they 
may be physically or however sophisticated their behavior. To 
place them behind bars at a time when the whole world seems 
to turn against them, and belief in themselves is shattered or 
distorted merely confirms the criminal role in which they see 
themselves. Jailing delinquent youngsters plays directly into 
their hands by giving them delinquency status among their 
peers. If they resent being treated like confirmed adult 
criminals, they may-and often do-strike back violently 
against society after release. The public tends to ignore that 
every youngster placed behind bars will return to the society 
which placed him there? 
Additionally, incarceration carries with it a criminal stigma. A 
community seldom has higher regard for those in jail than it 
does for the jail itself. This is especially detrimental to a youth 
from a rural or less sophisticated small community. 
The juvenile justice system was expressly created to remove 
children from the punitive forces of the criminal justice system. 
The practice of jailing juveniles, however, directly contravenes 
this purpose. Exposing a boy or girl to the punitive conditions of 
jail may jeopardize his or her emotional and physical well-being 
and may handicap future rehabilitation efforts. 
17. Komisaruk, Psychiatric Issues in the Incarceration of Juveniles, 21 Jw.  COURT 
J. 117, 118 (1971). 
18. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CFUME AND DELINQUENCY, STANDARDS AND GUIDES FOR THE 
DETENTION OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH 13 (2d ed. 1961). 
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Local and state officials who detain juveniles in adult jails 
may incur liability in two ways. First, officials who authorize or 
allow such detention in derogation of statute, or who fail to pre- 
vent or terminate such detention when under a legal duty to do 
so, may incur liability from the very fact that the detention oc- 
curs. Second, such officials may incur liability for the physical or 
mental injuries sustained by juveniles as a result of their being 
jailed with adults. Such liability may be incurred under both 
federal and state law. However, before discussing the legal theo- 
ries under which state and local officials can be held liable for 
detaining juveniles in adult jails, a discussion regarding which 
state and local officials are legally responsible for such deten- 
tions is essential. 
A. Statutory Obligations of Local and State Officials 
1.  County commissioners 
In Utah, the primary responsibility for providing for 
juveniles detained prior to legal proceedings rests upon the 
county commissioners.1s This obligation includes the develop- 
ment of detention homes or other facilities in compliance with 
the department of social services' minimum detention standards. 
If the county commissioners develop their own detention facili- 
ties, they must provide "suitable premises entirely distinct and 
separate from the ordinary jails, lockups or police cells."20 
Like Utah, most of the other states reviewed here place the 
19. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 55-lla-1 (Supp. 1979) provides: 
It shall be the duty of counties, with the assistance of the state department of 
public welfare, to make provision for the custody and detention of such chil- 
dren and other children under the age of eighteen years who shall be in need of 
detention care prior to their trial or examination or while awaiting assignment 
to a home or facility in such places as shall meet minimum standards of deten- 
tion care to be established by the state department of public welfare either by 
arrangement with some person or society willing to undertake the responsibil- 
ity of such temporary custody or detention on such terms as may be agreed 
upon, or by providing suitable premises entirely distinct and separate from the 
ordinary jails, lockups or police cells. 
Furthermore, the next section specifically designates the county commissioners as the 
individuals responsible for detention facilities. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 55-11a-2 (Supp. 1979). 
20. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 55-11a-2 (Supp. 1979). UTAH CODE ANN. 5 55-11a-3 (Supp. 
1979) provides that county commissioners may also contract with other counties for de- 
tention services. 
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primary responsibility for providing juvenile detention facilities 
on the county."' Two exceptions are Colorado, which places the 
entire responsibility on the Department of  institution^,^^ and 
Oregon, which places ultimate responsibility for facilities' per- 
sonnel on the juvenile court judge.%' The responsibility to pro- 
vide juvenile detention facilities includes the construction, main- 
tenance, and stafling of the facilities." In New Mexico and 
North Carolina the facilities must comply with minimum stan- 
dards set by a state agency.$6 
2. Sheriffs 
Juveniles brought to adult jails generally fall within the cus- 
tody of the local sheriffs, who therefore have immediate respon- 
sibility for their welfare and the conditions of their detention.'. 
21. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 33-6-1 (1978) (county commissioners obligated to estab- 
lish and equip "juvenile detention homes"); N.C. GEN. STAT. $ 153A-217(5) (1978) 
(county commissioners responsible to construct, maintain, and operate "local confine- 
ment facilities," which include "juvenile detention home[s]"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
13.04.135, 13.16.030 (1962)(construction and maintenance of separate detention facilities 
for juveniles a mandatory county function). Occasionally counties are assisted by other 
agencies. Under recent legislation in North Carolina, for example, the Department of 
Human Resources has developed regional detention facilities to augment those operated 
by counties. N.C. GEN. STAT. 134A-37 (Supp. 1979). 
22. COLO. REV. STAT. $8 19-8-117 to 120 (1978). The county commissioners do have 
responsibility, however, for those juveniles held in adult jails when "no other suitable 
place of confinement is available." Id. § 19-2-103(6). 
23. OR. REV. STAT. 419.612(1) (1977). Counties are authorized, however, to con- 
struct and operate detention facilities for dependent children as well as delinquents. The 
board of county commissioners is also empowered to build local correctional facilities 
that may house pre-trial detainees including juveniles. Id. $8 169.010, .150, .220, 419.575. 
24. New Mexico, for example, makes counties responsible for obtaining federal 
funds for juvenile detention facilities, contracting to build the facilities, maintaining the 
facilities, making rules for the administration of the facilities, and appointing and train- 
ing the staff. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-6 (1978). In Washington, the duty of maintaining 
such facilities includes the hiring of an adequate staff and "furnishing suitable food, 
clothing and recreational facilities for dependent, delinquent and wayward children." 
WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. $9 13.16.040, .050 (1962). 
25. Juvenile detention facility standards in New Mexico are set by the New Mexico 
Criminal Justice Department. N.M. STAT. ANN. $8 33-6-3, -4, -5, -6, -10. In North Caro- 
lina, they are set by the Department of Human Resources. N.C. GEN. STAT. $ 7A-576(b) 
(Supp. 1979). Should a child be detained in an adult jail, the jail must be one containing 
a juvenile holdover facility and must also be approved by the Department of Human 
Resources. Id. 7A-576(b). 
26. See UTAH CODE ANN. $8 78-3a-29 to 30 (1953). See also COLO. REV. STAT. $5 30- 
10-501, -511, -514 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. 33-3-1 (1978); OR. REV. STAT. $8 169.140, 
.220, .320 (1977). The county sheriff in North Carolina may appoint someone besides 
himself to operate or "keep" the jail, if he so desires. Alternatively, he may request the 
county commissioners to appoint some other person to operate the jail. N.C. GEN. STAT. 
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Utah law prohibits a sheriff taking a juvenile into custody from 
detaining him any longer than is reasonably necessary to obtain 
his name, age, residence, and ather necessary information and to 
contact his parents, guardian, or custodian. After the sheriff has 
obtained such information, he must either release the juvenile or 
take him without unnecessary delay to the court or to a place of 
detention designated by the court." In all instances when the 
youth is not released, the sheriff must notify the parents or 
guardian of the right to a prompt hearing to determine the justi- 
fication for any further detenti~n.'~ 
3. Departments of social services 
The Division of Family Services, as part of the Utah De- 
partment of Social Services, has overall responsibility for indi- 
vidual and family services in the state, including services for de- 
linquent children.'@ The division also has authority to develop 
and operate community centers for services, such as group home 
care, and to rent, purchase, or build facilities to carry out the 
functions of such centers.s0 
The Department of Social Services, acting through the Divi- 
sion of Family Services, is specifically authorized to assist coun- 
ties in establishing detention centerss1 and is directed to develop 
detention facilities where the counties have not provided ade- 
quate facilities. To enable the department to carry out this man- 
date, the legislature has authorized it to approve payment by the 
8 162-22 (1978). In Washington, however, where juveniles may not be held in jails or 
other adult detention facilities, sheriffs have no responsibility for them. WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. $8 70.48.020(1), (2), (4), .090 (Supp. 1978). 
27. Specifically, Utah law states: 
A sheriff, warden, or other official in charge of a jail or other facility for the 
detention of adult offenders or persons charged with crime, shall immediately 
notify the juvenile court when a child who is or appears to be under eighteen 
years of age is received at  the facility, and shall make arrangements for the 
transfer of the child to a detention facility, unless otherwise ordered by the 
juvenile court. . . . 
UTAH CODE ANN. 78-3a-31 (1953). 
A similar responsibility exists under New Mexico law, which, through its Children's 
Code, specifically charges sheriffs to inform the court within four working days (or 48 
consecutive hours, if shorter) whenever an individual who appears to be under eighteen 
is received at  the jail. N.M. STAT. ANN. $ 32-1-25(F) (1978). 
28. UTAH CODE ANN. 78-3a-30 (1953). 
29. The basic responsibilities of the Division are set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. 8 55- 
15b-6 (1953 & Supp. 1979). 
30. Id. 8 55-15b-14. 
31. Id. $ 55-lla-4 (Supp. 1979). 
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state of up to fifty percent of the total net expenditure for capi- 
tal inprovements and operation and maintenance of detention 
facilities by the counties, and to assist the counties in developing 
plans to provide suitable housing and other physical facilities to 
meet their detention requirementd2 
The legislative response in New Mexico has been entirely 
different. In 1978, the legislature created the detention facility 
grant fund, under which the state criminal justice department 
was given the authority to approve applications for grants to 
counties and municipalities for the purpose of constructing new 
facilities or modifying existing facilities to create sight and 
sound separation of juveniles from adults." 
The Department of Human Resources, its Secretary, and 
the Social Services Commission in North Carolina have substan- 
tial responsibilities regarding local confinement facilities. The 
department provides technical assistance, develops minimum 
standards for construction and operation, visits and inspects the 
facilities semi-annually, and makes written  report^.^' All stan- 
dards for the operation of the facilities must be approved by the 
commission and the G o v e r n ~ r . ~ ~  The secretary is responsible for 
corrective action in the event an inspection discloses that a facil- 
ity fails to meet minimum standards." The department also ap- 
proves holdover facilities for juveniles located in adult jails and 
sets standards for the operation of juvenile detention homes.s7 
Most importantly, however, the North Carolina Department of 
Human Services is responsible for the development and opera- 
tion of regional juvenile detention facilities, and the develop- 
ment of a subsidy program for county juvenile detention 
homes.38 
4. Juvenile court judges 
In most states juvenile court judges exercise exclusive origi- 
nal jurisdiction over all juveniles who violate federal, state, or 
32. Id. $8 55-11a-4 to -6. 
33. N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 32-2B-1 to 5 (Supp. 1978). The department of social services 
(Human Services Dep't) has no responsibility for detention care in New Mexico. 
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 153A-220 (1978). Local confinement facilities include juvenile 
detention homes. Id. 3 153A-217(5). 
35. Id. 5 153A-221(~). 
36. Id. 5 153A-223. 
37. Id. 5 7A-576(b) (Supp. 1979). 
38. Id. 5 134A-36 to 37. 
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local law? In Utah, the Board of Juvenile Court Judges, com- 
prised of all the state's juvenile court judges, is statutorily di- 
rected to consider and deal with problems that arise in connec- 
tion with the operation of the juvenile courts in any district2O In 
some other states, the judiciary actually manages the juvenile 
detention facilities. In Washington, for instance, the superior 
court judges in the larger counties either appoint a board of 
managers to administer detention services for those youth under 
juvenile court jurisdiction or transfer this responsibility to the 
county executive." In Oregon, the juvenile court judges hire 
counselors for the county juvenile department as well as a direc- 
tor of the department to administer the juvenile detention 
fa~ilities.'~ 
B. Liability Under Federal Law 
1. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act 
The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act" is 
primarily a funding statute. States receive federal funds to im- 
plement the goals of the Act, but become ineligible for continued 
funding if they fail to comply within a specified time period.44 
The Act does not specifically provide for private lawsuits by ag- 
grieved individuals, e.g., individual status offenders detained in 
secure facilities, or individual juveniles incarcerated in adult 
jails. 
Recent case law, however, indicates that individual juveniles 
may be able to maintain private causes of action under the Act. 
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,'"he United States Su- 
preme Court considered the question of whether an aggrieved 
individual can maintain a private cause of action under section 
901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972? Sec- 
tion 901 provides that no person shall be subjected to discrimi- 
39. See, e-g., COLO. REV. STAT. 5 19-1-104 (1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 32-1-9 (1978); 
OR. REV. STAT. $ 419.476(1) (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 78-3a-16 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. $ 13.04.030 (1962). 
40. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 78-3a-10 (1973). 
41. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. $5 13.20.010-.50 (1962). 
42. OR. REV. STAT. $5 419.604-.616 (1977). 
43. 42 U.S.C. $5 5601-5751 (1976). See notes 8-10 and accompanying text supra. 
44. 42 U.S.C. $ 5633(a), (c). The states of Colorado, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
Oregon, Utah, and Washington receive funding under the Act. 
45. 441 US.  677 (1979). 
46. 20 U.S.C. $ 1681 (1976). 
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nation on the basis of sex under any education program or activ- 
ity receiving federal financial assistance. Plaintiff Geraldine 
Cannon claimed that she had been denied admission to two 
medical schools receiving federal assistance because of her sex 
and filed suit against the schools for violation of section 901. 
Like the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 
Title IX is primarily designed as a funding statute and contains 
no express authorization of private lawsuits for violations of the 
law. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that a statute may 
be construed to provide a private remedy if four specific factors 
are satisfied: 
"In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a stat- 
ute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. 
First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial bene- 
fit the statute was enacted,'-that is, does the statute create a 
federal right in favor of the plaintifl Second, is there any in- 
dication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to cre- 
ate such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is i t  consistent with 
the underlying purposes of the legislative schnme to imply 
such a remedy for the plaintifl And finally, is the cause of 
action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area ba- 
sically the concern of the States, so that it  would be inappro- 
priate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?"47 
The Supreme Court concluded that because these four factors 
were satisfied, Title IX should be construed to allow private 
lawsuits. 
The Court's use of these four factors and its discussion in 
the Cannon opinion strongly indicate that aggrieved individuals 
can maintain private causes of action under the Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention Act. In terms of these four factors, 
it is evident, first, that juveniles confined in adult jails are "of 
the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted." 
One of the primary provisions of the Act" specifically prohibits 
the incarceration of juveniles in jails with adults. The second 
and third factors require an analysis of the legislative history of 
the Act. The legislative history is replete with references con- 
cerning the importance of prohibiting the detention of juveniles 
in adult jails. Indeed, much of the legislative history describes 
47. 441 U.S. at 688 n.9 (emphasis added)(quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 
(1975)) (citations omitted). 
48. 42 U.S.C. $ 5633(a)(13) (1976). 
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the operative provisions of the Act in terms of enforceable civil 
rights. Thus, in introducing S. 3146 (the predecessor of S. 821, 
which became the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
Act), Senator Bayh declared that the bill contained "an absolute 
prohibition" against detention or confinement of children in in- 
stitutions with adults." During floor debate on the Act in 1974, 
Senator Bayh declared that Congress was "establishing a na- 
tional standard for due process in the system of juvenile justice" 
through the legislation." In urging enactment of the provisions 
of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act that were passed as 
amendments to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven- 
tion Act and which prohibit confinement of juveniles in jails 
with adults, Senator Kennedy stated that the legislation enacted 
"the guarantee of basic rights to detained juveniles.'"l 
With respect to the fourth factor, it may be argued that the 
welfare and protection of juveniles is traditionally a matter for 
state law, and thus it may be inappropriate to infer a cause of 
action under federal law. Nevertheless, the welfare of juveniles is 
not solely a matter of state concern. Indeed, federal legislation 
has operated in this area for more than sixty years, including the 
Children's Bureau Act of 1912:2 the Social Security Act of 
1935,'3 The Child Health Act of 1967,M the Child Nutrition Act 
of 1966y the Crippled Children Services Act,W the Juvenile De- 
linquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968," the Juvenile 
Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act of 1961," and the 
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974?@ 
In addition, the Supreme Court's decision in Cannon notes 
two other reasons why a federal remedy is appropriate. First, 
"[slince the Civil War, the Federal Government and the federal 
courts have been the 'primary and powerful reliances' in pro- 
tecting citizens against" violations of civil rightdo Second, "it is 
49. 118 CONG. REC. 3049 (1972) (emphasis added). 
50. 120 CONG. REC. 25165 (1974) (emphasis added). 
51. 120 CONG. REC. 25184 (1974) (emphasis added). 
52. 42 U.S.C. $3 191-194 (1976). 
53. Id. $$ 301-306. 
54. Id. $$ 701-715, 729. 
55. Id. $9 1771-1786. 
.56. Id. $5 701-716. 
57. Id. $ 3801. 
58. Id. $5 2541-2548. 
59. Id. $ 5101. 
60. 441 U.S. at 708 (emphasis in original). 
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the expenditure of federal funds that provides the justification 
for this particular statutory prohibition. There can be no ques- 
tion but that this . . . analysis supports the implication of a pri- 
vate federal remed~."~' Like Title IX, the Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention Act provides federal funds to the states 
in order to foster and protect the civil rights of individuals. Ac- 
cordingly, it appears likely that a private right of action also ex- 
ists under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 
thereby enabling a juvenile confined in an adult jail to sue those 
responsible in federal court.62 
2. The right to treatment and section 1983 
a. Origins and development of the right to treatment. In 
recent years there has been a growing recognition by courts and 
commentators that individuals involuntarily committed to insti- 
tutions for treatment have a "right" to such treatment, and that 
those who do not in fact receive treatment suffer a violation of 
that right. The first discussion of a so-called right to treatment 
is generally credited to Dr. Morton B i r n b a ~ m . ~  Dr. Birnbaum 
was particularly concerned about the unavailability of psycho- 
therapy for mental patients committed to state hospitals for the 
ostensible purpose of treatment. He proposed 
that the courts under their traditional powers to protect the 
constitutional rights of our citizens begin to consider the prob- 
lem of whether or not a person who has been institutionalized 
solely because he is sufficiently mentally ill to require institu- 
- - -  
61. Id. at 708-09 (emphasis added). See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
62. See also Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1979), holding that handi- 
capped persons may not bring private lawsuits against federal agencies for alleged viola- 
tions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, although, as the court noted, "[elvery Circuit 
Court of Appeals which has addressed the issue has held that a private cause of action 
can be implied from the statute against the proper defendants." Id. a t  538. See, e.g., 
Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863,865 (2d Cir. 1977); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 
558 F.2d 413, 415 (8th Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th 
Cir. 1977). See also Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1109 
(N.D. Cal. 1979); Doe v. Marshall, 459 F. Supp. 1190, 1192 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Lora v. 
Board of Educ. 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1228-30 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. 
Supp. 791, 797-98 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Bartels v. Biernat, 427 F. Supp. 226, 229-30 (E.D. 
Wis. 1977); Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D.W. Va. 1976); Hairston v. Drosick, 
423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.W. Va. 1976); Cherry v. Matthews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 
1976); Gurmankin v. Costanza, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d 
Cir. 1977). Arguably, juveniles may now sue under 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 for violations of the 
statutory rights afforded them by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. 
See Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2520 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring). 
63. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960). 
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tionalization for care and treatment actually does receive ade- 
quate medical treatment so that he may regain his health, and 
therefore his liberty, as soon as possible; that the courts do this 
by means of recognizing and enforcing the right to treatment; 
and that the courts do this, independent of any action by any 
legislature, as a necessary and overdue development of our pre- 
sent concept of due process of law?' 
Dr. Birnbaum did not rigorously explore the constitutional bases 
for the right to treatment or the limits of the substantive right. 
Instead, he argued generally that "substantive due process of 
law does not allow a mentally ill person who has committed no 
crime to be deprived of his liberty by indefinitely institutional- 
izing him in a mental prison."66 He concluded that a writ of 
habeas corpus should be available to test the adequacy of treat- 
ment received in an individual case.@@ 
In 1966 in Rouse v. Cameron,67 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit became the first 
federal court to recognize the right to treatment as a basis for 
releasing an involuntarily committed individual. Charles Rouse, 
tried on charges of carrying a dangerous weapon, was found not 
guilty by reason of insanity and was committed to Saint Eliza- 
beth's Hospital. He challenged his confinement in a habeas 
corpus proceeding, claiming that his right to treatment was be- 
ing violated because he had received no psychiatric treatment.@' 
Chief Judge Bazelon, writing for a divided court, found that 
Congress had "established a statutory 'right to treatment' in the 
1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally I11 Act,"6B and remanded 
the case for further proceedings to determine whether Rouse 
had, in fact, received adequate treatment during his 
confinement. 
More noteworthy than the statutory holding in Rouse was 
the court's discussion in dictum regarding the potential constitu- 
tional issues. The court stated that "[albsence of treatment 
'might draw into question "the constitutionality of [this] 
mandatory commitment section" ' as applied."70 The court listed 
64. Id. at 503. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
68. Id. at 452. 
69. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). 
70. Id. The court quoted Darnel1 v. Carmeron, 348 F.2d 64, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1965), in 
which it had earlier noted that the absence of treatment might raise constitutional ques- 
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several ways in which confinement without treatment might vio- 
late constitutional standards. For example, where commitment 
is summary, without procedural safeguards, such commitment 
may violate the individual's right to procedural due process.71 In 
addition, the court noted that if Rouse had been convicted of 
the crime charged he could have been confined for a maximum 
of one year. At the time of the decision, however, he had been 
confined for four years, with no end in sight. This differential in 
periods of confinement raises not only obvious equal protection 
questions, but also issues under due process of law since it de- 
pends solely on the need for treatment that allegedly was not 
met.72 Finally, confinement for an indefinite period without 
treatment of one found not criminally responsible may be so in- 
humane as to constitute "cruel and unusual p~nishment."~' 
In 1971 in Wyatt v. S t i ~ k n e y , ~ ~  the court went one step fur- 
ther than Rouse and held that patients involuntarily confined in 
a hospital did have a constitutional right to treatment: 
The patients in Bryce Hospital, for the most part, were 
involuntarily committed through noncriminal procedures and 
without the constitutional protections that are afforded defen- 
dants in criminal proceedings. When patients are so committed 
for treatment purposes they unquestionably have a constitu- 
tional right to receive such individual treatment as will give 
each of them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve 
his or her mental condition. . . . Adequate and effective treat- 
ment is constitutionally required because, absent treatment, 
the hospital is transformed "into a penitentiary where one 
could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense."75 
- - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - 
tions. It  also cited Dr. Birnbaum's article in the American Bar Association Journal. 373 
F.2d at 453 n.6. 
71. 373 F.2d at 453; see Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960) 
(Fahy, J., concurring). 
72. 373 F.2d at 453; see Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 509 (4th Cir. 1964). 
73. 373 F.2d at 453. See also Robinson v. California, 370 US. 660 (1962); Easter v. 
District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (1966). The Rouse decision provoked a considerable 
amount of discussion by legal commentators. See, e.g., Bazelon, Implementing the Right 
to Treatment, 36 U .  CHI. L. REV. 742 (1969); Symposium-The Right to Treatment, 57 
GEO. L.J. 673 (1969); Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134 
(1967); Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 
87 (1967). 
74. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 
1305 (5th Cir. 1974). 
75. Id. at 784 (citations omitted) (quoting Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 
(D.C. Cir. 1960)). In contrast to Charles Rouse, who sought his release through habeas 
corpus, the inmates in Wyatt brought suit under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 
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The court's decision in Wyatt, which was affirmed by the Fifth 
Cir~uit, '~ generated a great deal of discussion among legal schol- 
ars,?? and was followed by a number of other courts.78 
While Wyatt v. Stickney was being litigated, Kenneth Don- 
aldson, a patient in the Florida State Hospital, sued his attend- 
ing physicians and the superintendent of the facility on the 
grounds that he had been involuntarily confined for fifteen years 
without treatment. At trial the jury awarded Donaldson $48,000. 
On appeal the Fifth Circuit used the lower court's language in 
Wyatt in holding that a patient has a "constitutional right to 
$ 1983, for deprivation of constitutional rights. 
76. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). 
77. See, e.g., Bailey & Pyfer, Deprivation of Liberty and the Right to Treatment, 7 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 519 (1974); Birnbaum, Some Remarks on the Right to Treatment, 
23 ALA. L. REV. 623 (1971); Drake, Enforcing the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 
10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 587 (1972); Gough, The Beyond-Control Child and the Right to 
Treatment: An Exercise in the Synthesis of Paradox, 16 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 182 (1971); 
Hoffman & Dunn, Beyond Rouse and Wyatt: An Administrative-Law Model for Ex- 
panding and Implementing the Mental Patient's Right to Treatment, 61 VA. L. REV. 
297 (1975); Schwitzgebel, Right to Treatment for the Mentally Disabled: The Need for 
Realistic Standards and Objective Criteria, 8 HARV. C.R.C.L.L. REV. 513 (1973); Sym- 
posium-Observations on the Right to Treatment, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 553 (1972); Develop- 
ments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as Developments]; Comment, Adequate Psychiatric Treatment-A 
Constitutional Right?, 19 CATH. LAW. 322 (1973); Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the 
Right of Civilly Committed Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
1282 (1973); Note, Guaranteeing Treatment for the Committed Mental Patient: The 
Troubled Enforcement of an Elusive Right, 32 MD. L. REV. 42 (1972); Comment, Reflec- 
tions on the Right to Treatment, 8 NEW ENC. L. REV. 231 (1973); Note, Wyatt v. 
Stickney-A Constitutional Right io Treatment for the Mentally Ill, 34 U .  PI=. L. REV. 
79 (1972); 27 O ~ A .  L  REV. 238 (1974). 
78. See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Davis v. Watkins, 384 
F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), 
aff 'd ,  550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 33 N.Y. 2d 161, 305 
N.E.2d 903, 350 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1973); Renelli v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 73 Misc. 
2d 261, 340 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Sup. Ct. 1973). See also Saville v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430 
(M.D. Tenn. 1974); Smith v. Wendell, 390 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 
386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445, 451-52 
(E.D. Wis. 1974); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686, 687 (N.D. Ill. 1973); In re 
Jones, 338 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1972); In re D.D., 118 N.J. Super. 1,6,285 A.2d 283,286 
(App. Div. 1971). 
The court in New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. 
Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), initially rejected the concept of a constitutional right to 
treatment in favor of an eighth amendment right for patients to be free from harm. The 
court ultimately recognized in a later opinion that "there is no bright line" separating 
the right to treatment, the right to care, and the right to be free from harm. New York 
State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715, 719 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). 
See also Scott v. Plank, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976); Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 
1022 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Woe v. Matthews, 408 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd sub 
nom. Woe v. Weinberger, 562 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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such individual treatment as will give him a reasonable opportu- 
nity to be cured or to improve his mental ~ondition."'~ When 
the Supreme Court heard the case, it  did not reach the broad 
issue of the right to treatment, rather it unanimously ruled on a 
single narrower issue in the case. The Court held that "[a] State 
cannot constitutionally confine [on the basis of mental illness 
alone] a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving 
safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and re- 
sponsible family members or friends.'"O 
The United States Supreme Court has never decided 
whether a constitutionally-based right to treatment exists. How- 
ever, in Kent v. United S t ~ t e s , ~ '  the Court commented on the 
plight of children in the juvenile justice system, noting that 
"[tlhere is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for con- 
cern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he 
gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous 
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."82 And 
later, in I n  re G a ~ l t , ~ ~  the Court "reiterate[d] the view" of Kent 
that juvenile justice procedures need not meet the constitutional 
requirements of adult criminal trials, but must provide essential 
"due process and fair treatment."84 
In the absence of definitive guidance by the Supreme Court, 
the lower courts have adopted a variety of approaches in finding 
a constitutional basis for the right to treatment? Following 
79. Donaldson v. O9Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other 
grounds and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
80. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,576 (1975). In a concurring opinion, Chief 
Justice Burger argued against the existence of a constitutional right to treatment. Id. a t  
578 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The narrow holding of the case, and Burger's concurring 
opinion have been the subject of extensive comment and criticism. See, e.g., Baldwin, 
OYConnor v. Donaldson: Involuntary Civil Commitment and the Right to Treatment, 7 
COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 573 (1975); Schoenfeld, Recent Developments in the Law 
Concerning the Mentally Ill-"A Corner-Stone of Legal Structure Laid in Mud," 9 U .  
TOL. L. REV. 1 (1977); Comment, Donaldson, Dangerousness and the Right to Treat- 
ment, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599 (1976); Note, "Without More": A Constitutional 
Right to Treatment?, 22 LOY. L. REV. 373 (1976); Note, Donaldson v. O'Connor: Consti- 
tutional Right to Treatment for the Involuntarily Civilly Committed, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 
174 (1975); Note, The Supreme Court Sidesteps the Right to Treatment Ques- 
tion-O'Connor v. Donaldson, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 299 (1976); Note, The Right to Treat- 
ment Case-That Wasn't, 30 U .  MIAMI L. REV. 486 (1976); 9 AKRON L. REV. 374 (1975). 
81. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
82. Id. at 556. 
83. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
84. Id. at 30. See also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); McKeiver v. Penn- 
sylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 US. 358 (1970). 
85. It  should be remembered that constitutional challenges to the detention of chil- 
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Judge Bazelon's lead in Rouse v. C a r n e r ~ n , ~ ~  some courts have 
based the right to treatment on a procedural due process and 
"quid pro quo" rationale: if the state involuntarily commits 
mentally ill or otherwise incompetent individuals to its custody 
without the procedural safeguards to which they are entitled in 
criminal prosecutions, it must correspondingly provide treat- 
ment that will rehabilitate the individual from his illness or dis- 
ability. Thus, while the individual loses constitutional procedu- 
ral protections, he gains rehabilitative treatment." 
Other courts have adopted Judge Bazelon's invocation of 
the due process clause? Wyatt v. Stickney was the first case to 
hold that the failure to provide adequate treatment is a violation 
of the constitutional right to due process: "To deprive any citi- 
zen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the con- 
finement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to pro- 
vide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due 
process."8e This argument is grounded on the rule articulated by 
the Supreme Court in Jackson v. IndianaM that "due process 
requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some 
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is 
committed."" 
Several courts have found a constitutional basis for the 
right to treatment in the eighth amendment's prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment." The reasoning of these 
dren in jails are not dependent upon a ritual incantation of the phrase "right to treat- 
ment," or upon a "right to treatment" analysis of the issues. Such detention may be 
challenged directly as violations of constitutional guarantees such as due process and 
freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. 
86. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See text accompanying note 71 supra. 
87. See text accompanying notes 102-13 infra. One commentator has found three 
variations of the "quid pro quo" rationale as used by the courts: "paradigm" quid pro 
quo, "procedural" quid pro quo, and "pseudo" quid pro quo. Spece, Preserving the Right 
to Treatment: A Critical Assessment and Constructive Development of Constitutional 
Right to Treatment Theories, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 4 (1978). 
88. See text accompanying note 72 supra. 
89. 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971). 
90. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
91. Id. at 738. In an even broader sense, the argument is based upon the principle 
that legislative means must be rationally related to legislative ends. See Developments, 
supra note 77, a t  1326. See also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
92. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Halderman v. Penn- 
hurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1315 (E.D. Pa. 1977); United States v. 
Johnston, 317 F. Supp. 66, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 
P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975); People v. Wilkins, 23 App. Div. 178, 259 N.Y.S.2d 
462 (1965). See also Spece, supra note 87, a t  17. 
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courts rests on the principle established by the Supreme Court 
in Robinson v. Californiae3 that punishment of certain "sta- 
tuses," such as drug addiction, constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment. Under this rationale, mental illness or other incom- 
petency is considered a status, and the drastic curtailment of 
liberty accompanying confinement without treatment is consid- 
ered cruel and unusual pun i~hmen t .~~  
Some courts have found that the state has a constitutional 
duty to protect involuntarily confined inmates from harm. At 
least one court has expanded this principle to include a right to 
a t  least a minimum level of psychological treatment;e5 other 
courts have registered approval of the basic rationale? 
Still other courts have based the right to treatment on the 
principle that the curtailment of fundamental liberties through 
involuntary confinement must follow the "least restrictive alter- 
native" available. This principle was presented by the Supreme 
Court in Shelton u. Tucker:@' 
[Elven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and 
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that 
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can 
be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridg- 
ment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for 
achieving the same basic purpose.s8 
According to this rationale, the state violates an individual's 
constitutional rights when it confines him and fails to provide 
minimally adequate treatment and habitation in the least re- 
strictive setting p o s ~ i b l e . ~  
Finally, a number of courts have followed Rouse u. Cameron 
93. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See Comment, The Eighth Amendment Right to Treat- 
ment for Involuntarily Committed Mental Patients, 61 IOWA L. REV. 1057 (1976). 
94. See text accompanying notes 118-25 infra. 
95. New York Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), consent decree approved, New York Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. 
v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). 
96. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. at 1318; 
Woe v. Mathews, 408 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). Cf. Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 
(4th Cir. 1977); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977) ("protection from 
harm" rationale applied in prison context). See Spece, supra note 87, at 28. 
97. 364 US. 479 (1960). 
98. Id. at 488 (footnotes omitted). 
99. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. a t  1318; Woe 
v. Mathews, 408 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 
(M.D. Ala. 1971). 
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directlylo0 and have found a basis for the right to treatment in 
state statutory and constitutional provisions.101 
b. Confinement of children in jails. The right to treatment 
doctrine, developed in cases involving persons involuntarily con- 
fined for mental illness, applies with equal force to the confine- 
ment of children in jails.loa The juvenile justice system is pre- 
mised on the goal of rehabilitation, and juvenile courts have 
always been considered analogous to social welfare agencies, 
designed to provide treatment and assistance for children who 
have violated criminal sanctions or demonstrated socially unac- 
ceptable behavior.loS 
The courts have recognized this principle. In one of the ear- 
liest cases considering the right to treatment, White u. Reid,lW 
the petitioner was a juvenile being held in a District of Columbia 
jail as a result of an alleged parole violation. Although the deci- 
sion was based on statutory grounds, the court noted that the 
commitment of the child to an adult jail rather than to a 
nonpunitive educational facility "cannot withstand an assault 
for violation of fundamental Constitutional safeguards."lo6 
The constitutional bases adopted by courts in applying the 
right to treatment doctrine to juveniles have been as diverse as 
those invoked in the cases involving mental illness. The proce- 
dural due processlquid pro quo reasoning has been invoked by 
several courts. In Morgan u. Sproat,lW the court concluded that 
juveniles who have been involuntarily committed have a consti- 
tutional right to treatment that emanates from two concepts. 
First, juveniles are incarcerated for the purpose of care and re- 
100. See text accompanying note 69 supra. 
101. See notes 131-34 and accompanying text infra. 
102. See, e.g., Renn, The Right to Treatment and the Juvenile, 19 CRIME & DELIN- 
QUENCY 477 (1973); Note, The Right to Treatment for Mentally Ill Juveniles in Califor- 
nia, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 865 (1976); Note, A Right to Treatment for Juveniles?, 1973 
WASH. U.L.Q. 157. 
103. See generally F. FAUST & P. BRANTINGTON, JUVENILE JUSTICE PH~OSOPHY 
(1974); A.  PLAT^, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (1969); Fox, Juve- 
nile Justice Reform: -4n Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Mack, The 
Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909); Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Con- 
stitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 167; Piersma, Ganousis & 
Kramer, The Juvenile Court: Current Problems, Legislative Proposals, and a Model 
Act, 20 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 1 (1975). 
104. 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954). 
105. Id. at 650. 
106. 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977). 
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habilitation. The reasoning of Jackson v. Indianalo7 requires 
that the program at the facility be reasonably related to that 
purpose. Second, juveniles are incarcerated without being pro- 
vided all the due process protections afforded adults in criminal 
cases. "This denial of due process safeguards would be constitu- 
tionally impermissible unless the incarceration of juveniles 
serves beneficent, rather than punitive, purposes. . . . For these 
reasons, the courts have held that due process requires that the 
incarceration of juveniles be for rehabilitation and treatment."lo8 
In Gary W. u. Louisiana,lo9 the court based its decision on 
the theory that the state may curtail a person's liberty in a non- 
criminal context only if there is rehabilitative treatment ex- 
changed for the equivalent denial of liberty. In defining this 
trade-off, the court concluded "[tlhat quid pro quo is care or 
treatment of the kind required to achieve the purpose of con- 
finement."l1° The court found that there is a constitutional right 
to treatment; however, what constitutes proper treatment must 
be decided on an individual basis: 
The constitutional right to treatment is a right to a program of 
treatment that affords the individual a reasonable chance to 
acquire and maintain those life skills that enable him to cope 
as effectively as his own capacities permit with the demands of 
his own person and of his environment and to raise the level of 
his physical, mental and social efficiency. 
. . . What the constitution requires as the state's due to 
the individual it confines is a program that is proper for that 
individual. 
Another federal court adopting the quid pro quo theory112 con- 
cluded that juvenile adjudications do not contain all of the due 
process safeguards found in adult adjudications because the 
goals of the juvenile justice system differ from those of the crim- 
inal justice system. The purposes of the criminal justice system 
are punishment, deterrence, and retribution while the primary 
goal of the juvenile justice system is rehabilitation. "Thus due 
process in the juvenile justice system requires that the post-ad- 
judicative stage of institutionalization further this goal of 
107. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
108. 432 F. Supp. at 1136 (citation omitted). 
109. 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976). 
110. Id. at 1216. 
111. Id. at 1219. 
112. Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972). 
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rehabilitation."'l3 
The procedural due processlquid pro quo rationale has been 
employed to declare that the confinement of children in jails vio- 
lates the children's constitutional rights. In Baker v. Hamil- 
ton,li4 the parents of two boys confined in a county jail for four 
days and four weeks respectively, brought a class action against 
the sheriff, the jail warden, and four juvenile court judges. The 
class action was commenced on behalf of the two boys and fifty- 
eight other boys who had been confined in the jail during 1971. 
After hearing expert testimony concerning the effects on 
juveniles of detention in the jail, and after personally visiting 
the jail, the judge ruled that the system of selective pre- and 
post-dispositional placement of juveniles in the jail constituted 
punishment of the juveniles as adults without the due process 
protections afforded adults. The court concluded that regardless 
of how well-intentioned the juvenile court judges may have been, 
their acts constituted violations of the fourteenth amendment.llb 
Other courts have found a more general basis for the right 
to treatment in the due process clause. In Pena v. New York 
State Division for Youth,l16 the court held that the absence of 
rehabilitative treatment of youth confined in the juvenile justice 
system constitutes a violation of due process rights guaranteed 
under the fourteenth amendment.l17 
Several courts have found the basis for juveniles' right to 
treatment in the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment. In Cox v. Turley,l18 the court specifi- 
113. Id. at 1364. 
114. 345 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Ky. 1972). 
115. Id. at 352. See also Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Creek v. 
Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), 
aff'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); Kautter v. Reid, 183 F. 
Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1960). In Kautter, the district court held that since children have not 
been protected by the full mantle of constitutional safeguards, "[tlo put such a child in 
'a place for [the] punishment of crimes' whose 'customary occupants are persons con- 
victed of crime or awaiting trial for crime' would, therefore, raise a serious constitutional 
question." 183 F. Supp. at 354 (quoting Benton v. Reid, 231 F.2d 780, 782 (D.C. Cir. 
1956)) (footnote omitted). Other courts have not hesitated to find that governments 
must provide something to a person in exchange for a loss of liberty following a proce- 
dure in which a person is denied the full panoply of due process safeguards. See Jackson 
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1975); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 (1972); 
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 159 
N.E.2d 82 (1959). 
116. 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
117. Id. at 206-07; accord, Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
118. 506 F.2d 1347 (6th Cir. 1974). 
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cally addressed the preadjudication detention of juveniles in 
county jails. The court held that the jailer's refusal to permit the 
boy to telephone his parents -and the boy's confinement with the 
general jail population without a probable cause hearing, consti- 
tuted cruel and unusual punishment. The court emphasized: 
"The worst and most illegal feature of all these proceedings 
[was] in lodging the child with the general population of the jail, 
without his ever seeing some official of the court."119 
In Swansey u. Elrod,lPo juveniles between the ages of thir- 
teen and sixteen, who had been confined in the Cook County jail 
pending prosecution, brought a civil rights action against the 
sheriff alleging that such incarceration constituted cruel and un- 
usual punishment. The court heard expert testimony that the 
jail experience would cause a " 'devastating, overwhelming emo- 
tional trauma with potential consolidation of [these children] in 
the direction of criminal behavior.' "lal The expert witness con- 
cluded that "the inital period of incarceration is crucial to the 
development of a young juvenile: if improperly treated the child 
will almost inevitably be converted into a hardened permanent 
criminal who will forever be destructive toward society and him- 
self."lP2 The court observed that thirteen to sixteen year olds 
"are not merely smaller versions of the adults incarcerated in 
[the] Cook County jail."lPS Because the incarceration was devas- 
tating to the juvenile and the physical conditions were reprehen- 
sible, the court found the incarcerations violated the eighth 
amendment. It concluded that the evolving standards of decency 
required more adequate conditions. 
In Baker v. Hamilton,lB4 the court also concluded that the 
detention of juveniles in adult jails constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment. The court's discussion is particularly significant be- 
cause many of the conditions present in the jail in that case are 
also present in the jails in rural areas of Utah and other states. 
The specific conditions mentioned include cramped quarters, 
poor illumination, poor air circulation, and broken locks; also 
cited were the lack of outdoor exercise or recreation and the ab- 
119. Id. at 1353. 
120. 386 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1975). 
121. Id. at 1141. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 1143. 
124. 345 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Ky. 1972). See text accompanying notes 114-15 supra. 
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sence of any attempt a t  rehabilitation.la5 
Furthermore, juveniles who are assaulted by other inmates 
may sue for violation of their right to be reasonably protected 
from violence in the facility. Several courts have held that con- 
finement that subjects those incarcerated to assaults and threats 
of violence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.la6 In addi- 
tion, juveniles who are separated from other inmates in order to 
protect them from assaults may suffer sensory deprivation and 
psychological damage in violation of their constitutional rights. 
In Lollis v. New York State Department of Social Services,la7 
the court found that the isolation of a fourteen year-old girl in a 
bare room without reading materials or other forms of recreation 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court relied on 
expert opinion that such isolation was "cruel and inhuman."la8 
The "protection from harm" rationale for the right to treat- 
mentlas and the principle of the "least restrictive alternative"lgO 
125. 345 F. Supp. a t  353. See also Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 
1974); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), aff 'd ,  491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); State v. Wilt, 252 S.E.2d 168 (W. Va. 1979); State v. 
Strickler, 251 S.E.2d 222 (W. Va. 1979). 
126. See, e.g., Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347 (6th Cir. 1974); Woodhous v. Virginia, 
487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973); Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1973); Rob- 
erts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971); Bethea v. 
Crouse, 417 F.2d 504 (10th Cir. 1969); Penn v. Oliver, 351 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1972); 
Gates v. Collier, 340 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 
(E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Kish v. Milwaukee, 48 F.R.D. 102 
(E.D. Wis. 1969), aff'd, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971). 
127. 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
128. Id. a t  480. See 16 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 340 (1971). There has been considerable 
discussion whether the eighth amendment ban against cruel and unusual punishment is 
limited to punishment imposed as a result of conviction for crime, and thus does not 
apply to confinements such as civil commitments or detention of juveniles in jails. See 
Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional 
Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 489 (1976); Spece, supra note 87, at  17-28; Develop- 
ments, supra note 77, a t  1259-64. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 US. 651 (1977), the Su- 
preme Court held that the eighth amendment does not apply to corporal punishment in 
public schools and indicated that it applys only to criminal punishments. Id. at 664-68. 
However, the Court explicitly did not consider "whether or under what circumstances 
persons involuntarily confined in mental or juvenile institutions can claim the protection 
of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at  669 n.37. Since detention of children in jails is closely 
analogous to criminal punishment, the constitutional protection should apply. In addi- 
tion, the Court noted that public school children have little need for eighth amendment 
protection, in view of the "openness" of the institution, id. at  670, a consideration that 
cuts the opposite way in dealing with the detention of children in jails. See generally 
Roberts, Right to Treatment for the Civilly Committed: A New Eighth Amendment 
Basis, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 731 (1978). 
129. See notes 95-96 and accompanying text supra. 
130. See notes 97-99 and accompanying text supra. See also Gary W. v. Louisiana, 
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have also been applied by several courts in the juvenile context. 
Finally, a number of courts have found the right to treat- 
ment for juveniles grounded in state statutory or constitutional 
law. In Creek v. Stone,lS1 a juvenile placed in a detention home 
prior to adjudication alleged that the home did not have facili- 
ties for the psychiatric care he needed. After analyzing the lan- 
guage of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir- 
cuit concluded that the Act "establishe[d] not only an important 
policy objective, but, in an appropriate case, a legal right to a 
custody that is not inconsistent with the parens patriae premise 
of the law."lS2 Similarly, in Nelson v. Heyne,lS3 the Seventh Cir- 
cuit ruled that the Indiana Juvenile Court Act provided a statu- 
tory basis for the right to rehabilitative treatment.lS4 
c. Enforcing the right to treatment-section 1983. A juve- 
nile's right to treatment may be enforced in a number of ways. 
The most commonly used vehicle for protecting civil rights is 42 
U.S.C. 5 1983.lS5 Along with its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 
437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 124 (E.D. Tex. 
1974), rev'd and remanded, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), reu'd and remanded, 430 U.S. 
322 (1977), remanded, 562 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 387 
(D. Minn. 1974). 
131. 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
132. Id. at 111. 
133. 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). 
134. Id. at 360 n.12. See McRedmond v. Wilson, 533 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1976); 
Lavette M. v. Corporation Counsel of N.Y., 35 N.Y.2d 136,316 N.E.2d 314,359 N.Y.S.2d 
20 (1974); Ellery C. v. Redlich, 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973). 
See also Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Lollis v. New York 
State Dep't of Social Sews., 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
A right to rehabilitative treatment is implicit in Utah law. The purpose of the Utah 
Juvenile Court Act of 1965 is stated in UTAH CODE ANN. 5 78-3a-1 (1953): 
I t  is the purpose of this act to secure for each child coming before the juvenile 
court such care, guidance, and control, preferably in his own home, as will 
serve his welfare and best interests of the state; to preserve and strengthen 
family ties whenever possible; to secure for any child who is removed from his 
home the care, guidance, and discipline required to assist him to develop into a 
responsible citizen, to improve the conditions and home environment responsi- 
ble for his delinquency; and, at the same time, to protect the community and 
its individual citizens against juvenile violence and juvenile lawbreaking. To 
this end this act shall be liberally construed. 
The doctrinal and practical difficulties inherent in the "right to treatment" principle 
have been debated at length. See, e.g., Gartas, The Constitutional Right to Treatment 
for Involuntarily Committed Mental Patients-What Limitations?, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 
291 (1975); Spece, supra note 87; Developments, supra note 77, at 1316. 
135. 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1976). Section 1983 provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
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U.S.C. 8 1343,lS6 section 1983 authorizes lawsuits to be brought 
in federal courts for violations of "rights, privileges, or immuni- 
ties secured by the Constitution and laws.'71s7 Since the right to 
treatment is one of the rights "secured by the Constitution and 
laws," it is enforceable under section 1983. 
Juveniles confined in jails, however, need not invoke the 
conceptual framework of the right to treatment cases in order to 
maintain a lawsuit for violation of their civil rights. They may 
file lawsuits in federal courts under section 1983 alleging viola- 
tions of their eighth amendment right of freedom from cruel and 
unusual punishment and their fourteenth amendment right of 
due process of law. The federal courts have jurisdiction to hear 
such claims, just as they have jurisdiction to entertain lawsuits 
for alleged violations of the right to treatment. 
Under the doctrine of pendent j u r i~d ic t ion ,~~~  lawsuits filed 
under section 1983 in federal courts may also include claims 
under state law when such claims arise out of a common set of 
operative facts and form the basis for separate but parallel 
grounds for relief. Thus, civil rights violations brought under 
section 1983 may be joined with claims under state tort laws. 
Juveniles confined in jails may also bring lawsuits in state 
courts. Such lawsuits can include claims under section 1983 as 
well as claims under state law.ls9 Hence, juveniles may bring 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the dep- 
rivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress. 
136. 28 U.S.C. 8 1343 (1976). Section 1343 provides: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized 
by law to be commenced by any person: 
. . . .  
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, stat- 
ute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or 
immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any 
Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons 
within the jurisdiction of the United States. 
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under 
any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, in- 
cluding the right to vote. 
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). 
138. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
139. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980); Long v. District of Columbia, 
469 F.2d 927, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1972); International Prisoners' Union v. Rizzo, 356 F. Supp. 
806, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Luker v. Nelson, 341 F. Supp. 111, 116 (N.D. Ill. 1972); New 
Times, Inc. v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 110 Ariz. 367, 519 P.2d 169 (1974); Williams v. 
Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 548 P.2d 1125, 129 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1976); Brown v. Pitchess, 13 
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lawsuits to protect their civil rights in either state or federal 
courts. The choice of forum will depend upon the nature of the 
claims involved, the applicable state or federal law, the experi- 
ence of state or federal judges with juvenile civil rights litigation, 
and the relative delays in state or federal courts in bringing 
cases to trial. 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
Section 1988140 is intended to provide an adequate federal 
remedy, where existing federal law is inadequate, by incorporat- 
ing the law of the state in which the federal court sits into fed- 
eral law."' It does not confer any substantive rights on individu- 
als; rather, it is a hollow vessel that is "filled" by state 
substantive law. The sole function of section 1988 is to provide 
access to federal courts for persons whose civil rights are recog- 
nized by state law but not federal law. In Brazier u. Cherry,"" 
the court described the function of section 1988 as follows: 
Thus 8 1988 declares a simple, direct, abbreviated test: what is 
needed in the particular case under scrutiny to make the civil 
rights statutes fully effective? The answer to that inquiry is 
then matched against (a) federal law and if it is found wanting 
the court must look to (b) state law currently in effect. To 
whatever extent (b) helps, it is automatically available, not be- 
cause it is procedure rather than substance, but because Con- 
gress says s ~ . ' ~ ~  
A substantial number of courts have utilized section 1988, 
often in conjunction with section 1983, to fashion remedies for 
civil rights inadequately protected by federal law but adequately 
protected by state law.144 Thus, even if the Juvenile Justice and 
-- pp 
Cal. 3d 518, 531 P.2d 772,119 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1975); Gabaldon v. United Farm Workers 
Organizing Comm., 35 Cal. App. 3d 757, 762 n.4, 111 Cal. Rptr. 203, 206 n.4 (1973); 
Dudley v. Bell, 50 Mich. App. 678, 213 N.W.2d 805 (1973); Clark v. Bond Stores, Inc., 41 
App. Div. 2d 620, 340 N.Y.S.2d 847 (1973). 
140. 42 U.S.C. 5 1988 (1976). 
141. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 US. 693 (1973). 
142. 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961). 
143. Id. at 409. 
144. See, e.g., Hall v. Wooten, 506 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1974) (state law applied to 
allow maintenance of lawsuit against county jail officials for death of county prisoner 
who was brutally murdered by drunken fellow inmates); Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101 
(5th Cir. 1973) (state law applied to hold administrator of psychiatric diagnostic clinic 
liable for false imprisonment of plaintiff); Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1973) 
(state law applied to hold sheriff liable for assaults committed by temporary law enforce- 
ment officers acting under his supervision); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 
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Delinquency Prevention Act does not create a private right of 
action against local and state officials, a child detained in an 
adult jail in Utah could still sue local and state officials in 
federal court under section 1988 by adopting and incorpo- 
rating Utah tort law and the substantive provisions of sections 
55-lla-1 and 78-3a-30 of the Utah Code,146 which prohibit 
confinement of juveniles in adult jails. 
C. Liability Under State Tort Law 
As indicated earlier, local and state officials may incur lia- 
bility under state tort law for injuries received by juveniles con- 
fined in adult jails, whether the injuries arise from the condi- 
tions of confinement in the jail or from assaults by other 
inmates. The general standard for tort liability was set forth by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Benally v. R0bins0n.l~~ In that case 
the widow and daughter of the deceased, a prisoner fatally in- 
jured in a fall down the stairs at the city jail, sued the arresting 
officer and the two officers on duty at the jail for wrongful death. 
The general standard of care to which the officers were held 
under state law was "that of using the degree of care and cau- 
tion which an ordinary reasonable and prudent person would use 
under the circ~mstances."~~~ 
In Benally the court cited Thomas v. Wi l l i am~l~~  for "an 
excellent and accurate statement of an officer's duty to a pris- 
oner in his custody."14@ Thomas v. Williams was a wrongful 
death action brought against the chief of police by the wife of a 
man arrested for drunk driving. The arresting officer had placed 
the partially unconscious offender in a cell, but had left him in 
possession of matches and cigarettes. The mattress in the cell 
was later set ablaze, and the prisoner died of burns and smoke 
inhalation. The court articulated the applicable standard of care 
as follows: 
"A sheriff owes to a prisoner placed in his custody a duty to 
keep the prisoner safely and free from harm, to render him 
medical aid when necessary, and to treat him humanely and 
1970) (federal court may resort to the state law of torts to supply the elements of § 1983 
claim). 
145. UTAH CODE ANN. $8 55-lla-1, 78-3a-30 (1953 & Supp. 1979). 
146. 14 Utah 2d 6, 376 P.2d 388 (1962). 
147. Id. at 9, 376 P.2d at 390. 
148. 105 Ga. App. 321, 124 S.E.2d 409 (1962). 
149. 14 Utah 2d at 9 n.2, 376 P.2d at 390 n.2. 
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refrain from oppressing him; and where a sheriff is negligent in 
his care and custody of a prisoner and as a result the prisoner 
receives injury or meets his death, . . . the sheriff would, in a 
proper case, be liable . . . to the injured prisoner or to his de- 
pendents as the case might be."lS0 
The court added: 
In the performance of his duty to exercise ordinary dili- 
gence to keep his prisoner safe and free from harm, an officer 
having custody of a prisoner, when he has knowledge of facts 
from which it might be concluded that the prisoner may harm 
himself or others unless preclusive measures are taken, must 
use reasonable care to prevent such harm. In some circum- 
stances reasonable care may require the officer to act affirma- 
tively to fulfil1 his duty.161 
In Shefield v. Turner,'" the Utah Supreme Court discussed 
whether an individual could be held liable under the state's sov- 
ereign immunity act and held that persons in charge of prisons 
or jails "could not be held liable unless they were guilty of some 
conduct which transcended the bounds of good faith perform- 
ance of their duty by a wilful or malicious wrongful act which 
they know or should know would result in injury."lm A sheriff 
who confines a child in an adult jail could be held liable for inju- 
ries sustained by the child as a consequence of that confinement. 
This result obtains for two reasons. First, confinement of a child 
in an adult jail "transcend[s] the bounds of good faith perform- 
ance of [the sheriff's] duty," since it is directly contrary to state 
law. A sheriff cannot act within his duty in confining a child in 
an adult jail when state law specifically prohibits such confine- 
ment. Second, it is so widely acknowledged that confinement of 
juveniles in adult jails is seriously harmful to juveniles that the 
sheriff "knows or should know" that such confinement would re- 
sult in injury to the child. 
In order to establish liability under a common law tort the- 
ory, an injured juvenile would be required to prove that the 
sheriff was negligent for confining him in the jail, and that such 
negligence was the proximate cause of the juvenile's injuries. 
Since it would be reasonably foreseeable that a child confined in 
150. 105 Ga. App. at 326, 124 S.E.2d at 412-13 (quoting Kendrick v. Adamson, 51 
Ga. App. 402, 180 S.E. 647 (1935)). 
151. Id. at 327, 124 S.E.2d at 413. 
152. 21 Utah 2d 314,445 P.2d 367 (1968). 
153. Id. at 317, 445 P.2d at 369. 
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an adult jail would suffer emotional, psychological, or physical 
injuries, the sheriffs negligent act in confining the child in the 
adult jail would be a proximate cause of the injuries. Moreover, 
the sheriffs violation of the clear statutory mandate would con- 
stitute negligence per se.lM A sheriff who confines a juvenile in 
an adult jail is therefore extremely vulnerable in a lawsuit for 
damages on behalf of a confined juvenile. 
I t  is more difficult to determine whether other officials, such 
as county commissioners, could be held liable in a tort action for 
injuries sustained by a juvenile incarcerated in an adult jail. 
Since county commissioners are specifically charged by state law 
with the responsibility of providing adequate detention facili- 
ties,'" their failure to provide such facilities would constitute a 
dereliction of their duties under state law and would therefore 
constitute negligence. 
The establishment of the proximate cause element in an ac- 
tion brought against county commissioners would appear to be 
more difficult because they do not have direct authority over 
specific juveniles detained in the jails. Aside from the possibility 
that failure to provide adequate detention facilities could be 
considered negligence per se, the critical issue is whether injuries 
to children are a foreseeable consequence of that failure to fulfill 
the statutory mandate. Under Utah law the county commission- 
ers could be considered "early wrongdoers" for having initially 
failed to provide adequate detention facilities, while the sheriff 
could be considered a "later wrongdoer" for confining juveniles 
in the adult jail when adequate detention facilities were not 
available. Since both the county commissioners and the sheriff 
154. Prosser has said the following concerning per se violations of satutory mandate: 
Once the statute is determined to be applicable-which is to say, once it is 
interpreted as designed to protect the class of persons in which the plaintiff is 
included, against the risk of the type of harm which has in fact occurred as a 
result of its violation-the great majority of the courts hold that an unexcused 
violation is conclusive on the issue of negligence, and that the court must so 
direct the jury. The standard of conduct is taken over by the court from that 
fixed by the legislature, and "jurors have no dispensing power by which to re- 
lax it," except in so far as the court may recognize the possibility of a valid 
excuse for disobedience of the law. This usually is expressed by saying that the 
unexcused violation is negligence "per se," or in itself. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 200 (4th ed. 197l)(footnotes omitted). For a 
discussion of the principle of negligence per se under New Mexico law, see Castillo v. 
United States, 406 F. Supp. 585, 591 (D.N.M. 1975), aff'd, 552 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir. 
1977). 
155. UTAH CODE ANN. $9 55-lla-1 to 2 (Supp. 1979). 
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would have violated state law, and therefore would be negligent, 
it appears that both the sheriff and the commissioners could be 
held liable if the injuries to juveniles are foreseeable. In the 
leading Utah case on proximate cause, Hillyard v. Utah By- 
Products Co.,'" the Utah Supreme Court noted: 
"The earlier of the two wrongdoers, even though his wrong 
has merely set the stage on which the later wrongdoer acts to 
the plaintiff's injury, is in most jurisdictions no longer relieved 
from responsibility merely because the later act of the other 
wrongdoer has been a means by which his own misconduct was 
-. - made harmful. The test has come to be whether the later act, 
which realized the harmful potentialities of the situation cre- 
ated by the defendant, was itself f~reseeable."'~~ 
Holding the county commissioners liable for the sheriffs act 
of placing juveniles in adult jails would be "based upon the pro- 
position that one cannot excuse himself from liability arising 
from his negligent acts merely because the later negligence of 
another concurs to cause an injury if the later act was a legally 
foreseeable event."168 Thus, the fact that the sheriff directly 
places a juvenile in an adult jail does not insulate the county 
commissioners from liability. Since their failure to provide ade- 
quate detention facilities is contrary to state law, and since in- 
jury to juveniles is foreseeable, they may be held liable in dam- 
age actions. 
As indicated earlier, under the doctrine of pendent jurisdic- 
tion, state tort claims could be joined with federal civil rights 
claims in lawsuits filed in federal court. Hence, sheriffs or county 
commissioners could be sued in federal court for violations of 
federal law, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
Act, and the federal Civil Rights Act. They could also be sued in 
the same action for negligence under state law.'" 
IV. IMMUNITY OF STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS 
The current doctrines of sovereign immunity arose from 
power struggles in feudal England. The ancient English tradition 
156. 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953). 
157. Id. at 148-49, 263 P.2d at 290-91 (quoting Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 
HARV. L. REV. 1225, 1229 (1937)). 
158. Id. at 149, 263 P.2d at 291 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). 
159. See text accompanying notes 135-39 supra. Juveniles could also sue for false 
imprisonment. See Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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that "the King could do no wrong," meant that he could not be 
sued on any grounds. Since the judges at the time were agents of 
the King, they too enjoyed absolute immunity. The English Par- 
liament in 1688 conferred immunity upon itself in the Bill of 
Rights in order to protect its independence from the King.160. 
The doctrine that the government cannot be sued took early 
root in the United States and is still stringently adhered to in 
some states. 
It is important 'to remember that any applicable immunity 
usually only protects a public official from liability for damages; 
with few exceptions, public officials are not immune to lawsuits 
for declaratory and injunctive relief. 
A. Immunity Under Federal Law for Violation of Civil 
Rights 
1. Immunity of judges, prosecutors, and legislators 
As a practical matter, judges, prosecutors, and legislators 
enjoy virtually absolute immunity for acts done in the perform- 
ance of their official duties. Recent Supreme Court cases demon- 
strate the extensive breadth of this immunity. In Stump v. 
Sparkman,161 a woman brought suit again* an Indiana circuit 
court judge who had approved a petition by her mother to have 
the woman sterilized when she was only fifteen. The young girl 
went to the hospital ostensibly to have her appendix removed; in 
fact, a tubal ligation was performed. No hearing was held on the 
petition, and no one was appointed to represent the interests of 
the girl, who was never informed of the nature of the operation 
to be performed on her. She learned of the sterilization only af- 
ter she married and attempted to have children. Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court ruled that a judge enjoys absolute immunity 
unless the act done is "in clear absence of all jurisdiction" or is 
nonjudicial in nature. Since Indiana law gave circuit judges ju- 
risdiction to act upon petitions for sterilization, the Supreme 
160. See generally Freed, Executive Oficial Immunity for Constitutional Viola- 
tions: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 526 (1977). Clearly, the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity has been substantially eroded in this country. This deterioration has 
been caused both by statutory changes and court rulings. The first state to abrogate the 
doctrine statutorily was New York in 1929. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT 8 8 (McKinney 1963). The 
federal government followed suit in 1946. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. $8 1346(b), 
2671-2680 (1970). 
161. 435 US. 349 (1978). 
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Court ruled that the judge could not be held liable.lB2 
Similar principles apply to legislators and prosecutors. In 
Tenney u. B r a n d h o ~ e , ~ ~ ~  Brandhove had circulated a petition in 
the California legislature opposing the Tenney Committee on 
Un-American Activities. The Committee called Brandhove as a 
witness and prosecuted him when he refused to testify. In 
Brandhove's lawsuit against members of the Committee for vio- 
lating his constitutional rights, the Supreme Court ruled that 
legislators could not be held liable for their official acts, even 
when they used the legislative process to punish the exercise of 
first amendment rights. In Imbler v. Pachtman,la the Court up- 
held the immunity of a prosecutor who knowingly used perjured 
evidence. 
However, when judges, legislators, and prosecutors act 
outside of their official realm, they do not enjoy absolute immu- 
nity from liability. Courts have held judges liable where they 
issued orders not authorized by state law,lB6 interfered with 
judicial proceedings after being disqualified,lq assaulted a per- 
son in their courtroom,167 or performed legislative or administra- 
tive (as opposed to judicial) functions.lB8 In these situations, a 
qualified, "good faith" immunity applies, rather than absolute 
immunity.16@ 
Concerning the acts of legislators, the courts have held that 
the following activities are not legislative in nature: distributing 
to the public materials gathered by a legislative committee,170 
accepting bribes in return for votes,171 and enforcing or execut- 
ing illegal legislative bills.17' Any immunity that applies to legis- 
lators also encompasses their aides and employees performing 
legislative action that would be protected if performed directly 
162. See Note, Judicial Immunity: An Unqualified Sanction of Tyranny From the 
Bench?, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 810 (1978). 
163. 341 US. 367 (1951). 
164. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
165. Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971). 
166. Spires v. Bottorff, 317 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1963). 
167. Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974); Lucarell v. McNair, 453 
F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1972). 
168. Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 
(3rd Cir. 1966); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965); Atcherson v. 
Siebenmann, 458 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Iowa 1978), modified, 605 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1979). 
169. Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970). 
170. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973). 
171. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). 
172. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). 
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by the legislator.17' On the other hand, quasi-legislative officials 
like county commissioners or city council members are generally 
accorded only a qualified, "good faith" immunity similar to that 
enjoyed by executive officials.17' 
2. Immunity of executive officials 
The courts have applied different types of immunity to ex- 
ecutive officials, depending upon the nature of the wrong al- 
leged. In Barr v.  matte^,'^^ employees of the Federal Office of 
Rent Stabilization sued their superior for libelous statements 
contained in a press release he had issued. The Supreme Court 
held that a low-level federal administrative official who has been 
sued for defamation is absolutely immune from liability. Since 
Barr, the lower federal courts have extended the decision, con- 
ferring absolute immunity on federal executive officials for virtu- 
ally all tort actions based on "discretionary" acts.176 
When government officials are accused of violating the con- 
stitutional rights of others, however, they enjoy only a qualified 
or limited immunity. In Scheuer v. Rhodes,lT7 the Governor of 
Ohio and other high state officials were accused of unnecessarily 
deploying National Guard troops at Kent State University, and 
thereby "intentionally, recklessly, willfully, and wantonly" vio- 
lating the rights of four students who were killed in the resulting 
confrontation. The Supreme Court noted that there is leeway in 
the law for public officials to make mistakes: 
Public officials, whether governors, mayors or police, legislatots 
or judges, who fail to make decisions when they are needed or 
who do not act to implement decisions when they are made do 
not fully and faithfully perform the duties of their offices. Im- 
plicit in the idea that officials have some immunity-absolute 
or qualified-for their acts, is a recognition that they may err. 
The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume 
that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from 
173. Id. 
174. See Charlotte v. Local 660, Intl Ass'n of Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283 (1976); 
Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970); Adler v. Lynch, 415 F. Supp. 705 (D. 
Neb. 1976); Oberhelman v. Schultze, 371 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd without 
opinion, 505 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1974). See also Cobb v. City of Malden, 202 F.2d 701,705 
(1st Cir. 1953) (Magruder, C.J., concurring). 
175. 360 U.S. 564 (1959). 
176. See, e.g., Sowders v. Damron, 457 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1972); Estate of Burks v. 
Ross, 438 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1971). 
177. 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
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such error than not to decide or act at all.178 
Moreover, the Court stated that high officials are granted more 
leeway than their subordinates: the higher the official position, 
the broader the range of duties and responsibilities of the offi- 
cial, and the greater the scope of allowable discretion. 
The qualified immunity of an executive official, therefore, 
depends upon the particular position the official holds and the 
circumstances surrounding the official acts. The Supreme Court 
described the immunity as follows: 
These considerations suggest that, in varying scope, a qualified 
immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of gov- 
ernment, the variation being dependent upon the scope of dis- 
cretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circum- 
stances as they reasonably appeared at  the time of the action 
on which liability is sought to be based. It  is the existence of 
reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in the 
light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, 
that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers 
for acts performed in the course of official conduct.17B 
In Wood v. S t r i ~ k l a n d , ~ ~ ~  a civil rights case brought by pub- 
lic high school students who claimed that they were expelled 
from school in violation of their constitutional rights, the Su- 
preme Court clarified its description of limited executive immu- 
nity. Although the specific holding of the case relates to school 
board members, the standard for immunity should apply to 
other executive officials as well: 
[W]e hold that a school board member is not immune from 
liability for damages under 1 1983 if he knew or reasonably 
should have known that the action he took within his sphere of 
official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of 
the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious 
intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or 
other injury to the student. That is not to say that school 
board members are "charged with predicting the future course 
of constitutional law." . . . A compensatory award will be ap- 
propriate only if the school board member has acted with such 
an impermissible motivation or with such disregard of the stu- 
dent's clearly established constitutional rights that his action 
178. Id. at 241-42 (footnote omitted). 
179. Id. at 247-48. 
180. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
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cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.18' 
Thus, there are two critical questions after Wood u. Strick- 
land: whether the official acted with malice, and whether the of- 
ficial's actions were reasonable in light of the information avail- 
able and the existing state of the law. If the official acted with 
malice toward the plaintiff, or if the official's actions were unrea- 
sonable in light of the available information and the state of the 
law, there is no immunity. 
Good faith conduct must be proven by the official asserting 
the immunity.182 The lack of malice does not in and of itself es- 
tablish good faith. Neither does a refusal to do what one knows 
or should know is legal because of a fear of the repercussions 
justify the conduct.18a In addition, failure on the part of an offi- 
cial to take appropriate steps to avoid the injury complained of 
may defeat a "good faith" defense to a damage action even if the 
official did not act out of malice or ill will.184 Finally, lack of 
good faith may be inferred from failure to act.186 
In view of the explicit prohibitions in state and federal stat- 
utes against the confinement of juveniles in adult jails, it is 
doubtful that local executive officials could assert a "good faith" ' 
defense for such illegal incar~erat ion.~~~ 
181. Id. at 322 (citation omitted) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,557 (1967)). 
See also Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). 
182. Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 538 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 
1976); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1975). According to the recent 
case of Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S. Ct. 1920 (1980), the plaintiff need not allege bad faith in 
his complaint. 
183. See, e.g., Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975); Faraca v. Clements, 
506 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1975). 
184. See, e.g., Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210, 1215 (5th Cir. 1976). 
185. See, e.g., Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976); Harris v. Chanclor, 537 
F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1976); Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1951). 
186. Regarding the scope of immunity of executive officials under Scheuer v. Rhodes 
and Wood v. Strickland, see Anson, Implications of Goss v. Lopez and Wood v. Strick- 
land for Educators; Proceedings of The National Institute of Education Conference, 4 
J.L. EDUC. 565 (1975); Kattan, Knocking on Wood: Some Thoughts on the Immunities 
of State Officials to Civil Rights Damage Actions, 30 VAND. L. REV. 941 (1977); Mar- 
quardt & Plenk, School Suspension and the Right of Due Process: The Effects of Goss 
and Wood in Utah Schools, 3 J. CONTEMP. L. 85 (1976); Note, Wood v. Strickland: Lia- 
bility of School Board Members for Damages Resulting from a Deprivation of a Stu- 
dent's Civil Rights, 13 Cma. W.L. REV. 153 (1976); Note, Immunity of Public Officials 
from Liability for Damages Under 52 U.S.C. § 1983, 89 HARV. L. REV. 219 (1975); Note, 
Wood v. Strickland: Issues and Implications for School Board Participation, 15 J. F m .  
L. 235 (1976); Note, Sovereign Immunity--Scheuer v. Rhodes: Reconciling Section 1983 
Damage Actions With Governmental Immunities, 53 N.C.L. REV. 439 (1974); Comment, 
Official Immunity from Damages in Section 1983 Suits: Wood v. Strickland, 56 OR. L. 
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3. Immunity of local governmental entities 
The Supreme Court initially held, in Monroe v. Pape,ls7 
that municipal bodies were not "persons" who could be held lia- 
ble under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. However, in Mo- 
nell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New 
York,lB8 the Court overruled Monroe v. Pape and held that local 
government units do not enjoy an absolute immunity from lia- 
bility. Thus, local governmental entities, including cities, towns, 
police departments, and city agencies can be sued directly under 
section 1983 for money damages and declaratory or injunctive 
relief. Such an action may be brought where the allegedly un- 
constitutional action implements or executes a policy statement, 
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promul- 
gated by that entity's officers, or where the action constitutes 
governmental "custom," even though such a custom has not re- 
ceived formal approval through the entity's official decision- 
making channels. 
The Court imposed one limitation on the doctrine it an- 
nounced in Monell: a municipality cannot be held liable under a 
theory of respondeat superior solely because it employs a person 
who causes harm to another. Thus, the basis for liability must be 
grounded upon an official act, declaration, or custom; the munic- 
ipality cannot be held liable merely because one of its employees 
does something that injures another.18@ 
4. Liability of public officials and the eleventh amendment 
In 1798 Congress passed the eleventh amendment, which 
prohibits suits against the states by citizens or by foreign coun- 
tries. In Edelman v. Jordan,lw the Supreme Court held that 
where a lawsuit names a state official as a defendant and seeks 
money damages or restitution that will be paid out of the state 
treasury, a request for such relief is in effect a suit against the 
REV. 124 (1977); Comment, Students' Rights Versus Administrators' Immunity: Goss v. 
Lopez and Wood v. Strickland, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 102 (1975); Note, Civil 
Rights-State Executive Officials Afforded Qualified Immunity From Liability in Suits 
Maintained Under Section 1983, 20 VILL. L. REV. 1057 (1974-75). 
187. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
188. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
189. Id.; Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court has 
recently held that municipalities cannot assert the good-faith defense available to execu- 
tive officials. See Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980). 
190. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
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state itself, and is therefore barred by the eleventh amendment. 
The effect of the eleventh amendment on litigation against 
public officials involves the consideration of several important 
concepts. First, injunctive relief, as opposed to money damages, 
is not barred by the eleventh amendment, even though it may 
require significant expenditure of state funds.lel Second, the 
eleventh amendment only bars money awards that would be 
paid out of the state treasury. Restitution or damage awards 
that would originate from a different source are not barred?" 
Moreover, state officials are usually sued both in their official 
and individual capacities. A judgment against an official in his 
individual capacity must be paid by the individual, not the 
state, and is therefore not barred by the eleventh amendment.le' 
Finally, counties, cities, towns, and other municipal subdivisions 
of the state are not protected by the eleventh amendment.lH 
5. State governmental immunity acts 
State governmental immunity acts may bar litigation 
against state and local officials in state court for torts, but they 
do not immunize them from federal civil rights claims. In Marti- 
nez u. California,le6 the survivors of a fifteen year-old girl mur- 
dered by a parolee sued state officials for damages in state court. 
The Supreme Court held first that the California immunity stat- 
ute was not unconstitutional when employed to deny a tort 
claim arising under state law. However, turning to the appel- 
lants' civil rights claim, the Court ruled that the state immunity 
statute did not control the section 1983 claim, even though that 
claim was being advanced in a state court proceeding.lm 
In Hampton u. City of Chicago,le7 the Seventh Circuit held 
that "[c]onduct by persons acting under color of state law which 
is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 or § 1985(3) cannot be immu- 
191. Id.; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); McAuliffe v. Carlson, 520 F.2d 1305 
(2d Cir. 1975); King v. Carey, 405 F. Supp. 41 (W.D.N.Y. 1975). 
192. Bowen v. Hackett, 387 F. Supp. 1212 (D.R.I. 1975); Shiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 
257 (5th Cir. 1975). 
193. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Clegg v. Slater, 420 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. 
Okla. 1976). 
194. See Wright v. Houston Independent School Dist., 393 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. Tex. 
1975), vacated on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1383 (2d Cir. 1978). 
195. 48 U.S.L.W. 4076 (Sup. Ct. 1980). 
196. Id. at 4077. 
197. 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973). 
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nized by state law."le8 Plaintiffs alleged that fourteen Chicago 
police officers and fifteen other public officials had engaged in a 
conspiracy to deny their first amendment rights as members of 
the Black Panther Party by illegal forced entry, unjustifiable use 
of excessive and deadly force, and malicious prosecution. The 
trial court had relied on the Illinois Tort Immunity Act to dis- 
miss the claims against the fifteen public officials, among whom 
were state attorneys who had assisted in the planning and exe- 
cution of the police raid. The court of appeals held that such 
reliance was misplaced since "[a] construction of the federal 
statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have con- 
trolling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory 
promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures 
that the proper construction may be enforced."w 
In Smith v. Losee,'O0 the defendant public officials appealed 
from a damages award in a section 1983 civil rights action 
brought because of their alleged denial of plaintiffs rights to 
free speech and due process. While it held the defendant board 
of education immune from state liability for damages because of 
the doctrine of governmental immunity, the court of appeals af- 
firmed the trial court's award of actual and punitive damages 
against three individual defendants. In applying the doctrine of 
official privilege, the court observed: 
[Tlhe rule [of official privilege] must be here recognized and 
applied. It is one which has been formulated and used in the 
federal courts; it must be a "federal" one because the federally 
created cause of action [§ 19831 cannot be restricted by state 
laws or rules relating to sovereign immunity nor to official 
privilege.001 
Thus, state governmental immunity acts are not applicable to 
section 1983 suits for illegal detention brought by juveniles in 
either state or federal courts. The same reasoning applies to ac- 
tions filed pursuant to section 1988 and the Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention Act. 
198. Id. at 607. 
199. Id. Some state statutes explicitly comply with the federal court *kings. See 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 3 4.92.170 (Supp. 1978). 
200. 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973). 
201. Id. at 341. 
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B. Immunity Under State Law 
Modern state laws governing the immunity of governmental 
officials, agencies, and units of government from suit for injury 
by private persons vary substantially. The Utah statute repre- 
sents one response. It provides that all governmental entities are 
immune from suit for any injury resulting from the activities of 
the entity where the entity is engaged in the exercise and dis- 
charge of a governmental function, except as otherwise provided 
in the Governmental Immunity Act.%02 It further provides that 
immunity is waived where the injuries are caused by the negli- 
gent acts or omissions of employees committed within the scope 
of their employment, unless the injuries arise because of assault, 
battery, violation of civil rights, or incarceration of any person in 
any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal con- 
finement..OS Accordingly, the immunity of governmental entities 
is not waived as to injuries resulting from the illegal confinement 
of juveniles in adult jails. 
Colorado law represents a different response. Under the 
Colorado Governmental Immunity Act,'04 public entities are 
generally immune from damage claims. However, there are six 
enumerated exceptions, one of which precludes the use of immu- 
nity as a defense in the operation of public hospitals, penitentia- 
ries, reformatories or j a i l ~ . ~ ~ T h u s ,  governmental immunity is 
waived as to injuries arising from the incarceration of juveniles 
in adult jails in Colorado. 
Furthermore, the sovereign immunity defense is not avail- 
able to public employees and governmental officials in Colorado. 
In Kristensen u. Jones," the Colorado Supreme Court ruled 
that the immunity act only applies to public entities and not to 
employees, who may be sued individually under common law 
claims. The immunity act does provide, however, that the gov- 
ernmental entity may be liable for the costs of the defense of an 
employee sued for injuries sustained, provided the alleged act or 
omission occurred within the scope of employment and was 
neither willful nor wanton.207 
The New Mexico Tort Claims Act falls somewhere in be- 
202. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-3 (1953). 
203. Id. 63-30-10. 
204. COLO. REV. STAT. $ 24-10-101 to 117 (1973). 
205. Id. $ 24-10-106. 
206. 195 Colo. 122, 575 P.2d 854 (1978). 
207. COLO. REV. STAT. 24-10-110 (1973). 
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tween the Utah and Colorado acts. It provides that all govern- 
mental entities and public employees are immune from suit for 
any injury resulting from the activities of the entities or their 
employees while acting within the scope of their duties, except 
as otherwise provided in the Tort Claims Act.208 However, im- 
munity is waived when a claim is made against a public em- 
ployee for any torts alleged to have been committed within the 
scope of his duty and involving any violation of property rights 
or any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu- 
tion and laws of the United States or the constitution and laws 
of New Mexico. If a tort committed by a public employee within 
the scope of his employment is malicious or fraudulent, the gov- 
ernmental entity is immune from suit but the employee is not."OD 
Thus it would appear that sheriffs in New Mexico, as law 
enforcement officials, may be liable for injuries arising from in- 
carceration of juveniles in adult jails. Similarly, both sheriffs and 
county commissioners may be liable based upon the failure to 
adequately maintain and operate the jails. Even assuming for 
the sake of argument that sheriffs and county commissioners in 
New Mexico are immune for the above reasons, if they act 
outside the scope of their official duties, they may be held liable 
for injuries resulting from such activities."O 
Since the incarceration of children in need of supervision 
and of neglected children in adult jails is prohibited by state 
statute, and since alleged juvenile delinquents may only be de- 
tained under precise and limited circumstances, it would appear 
that such incarceration does not fall within the scope of the offi- 
cial duties of any government official.211 Accordingly, New Mex- 
ico government officials can be held liable for injuries resulting 
from illegal confinement of juveniles in adult jails."12 
208. N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 41-4-4 (1978). 
209. Id. 8 41-4-4B. 
210. See Montoya v. City of Albuquerque, 82 N.M. 90, 476 P.2d 60 (1970) (decided 
under prior law); Salazar v. Town of Bernalillo, 62 N.M. 199, 307 P.2d 186 (1956) (de- 
cided under prior law). 
211. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-25(c), (e) (1978). 
212. The Oregon tort claims law, Or. Rev. Stat. $8 30.260-300 (1953), makes every 
public body liable for its torts and those of its officials acting within the scope of their 
employment except in areas expressly limited by the act. Id. 5 30.265(1). The Oregon law 
also contains a "discretionary acts exception" that restores immunity for every public 
body and its officers, employees, and agents acting within the scope of their employment 
for acts deemed discretionary. The obvious difficulty is in distinguishing discretionary 
acts from ministerial or operational ones. See Daugherty v. Oregon State Highway 
Comm., 270 Or. 144, 147,526 P.2d 1005, 1006 (1974); Smith v. Cooper, 256 Or. 485, 499, 
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C.  Indemnification of Local and State Oficials 
Utah law provides that public employees who are the sub- 
ject of lawsuits for activities within the scope of their employ- 
ment may be defended by the public entity for which they work, 
and may be indemnified for money judgments against them re- 
sulting from such litigation.213 
Local and state officials who are sued for confinement of 
juveniles in adult jails may not enjoy the benefits of the Utah 
Indemnification Act, however. These officials may be held per- 
sonally liable for two reasons. First, since such activity is ex- 
pressly prohibited by state law in Utah, such confinement is not 
within the legitimate scope of the officials' public employment. 
The rationale is the same in other states where alleged juvenile 
delinquents may be held in adult jails under circumstances 
where there is no sight and sound separation from adultsF4 Sec- 
ond, section 63-48-3 of the Utah Code expressly states that "[nlo 
public entity is obligated to pay any judgment based upon a 
claim against an officer or employee if it is established that the 
officer or employee acted or failed to act due to gross negligence, 
fraud, or malice."216 Although "gross negligence" is not suscepti- 
475 P.2d 78, 85 (1970). See also Eldredge v. Kamp Kachess Youth Servs., Inc., 90 Wash. 
2d 402, 583 P.2d 626 (1978); Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 
246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965). Washington also waived immunity by statute. WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. !$$ 4.92.010-.I70 (1962 & Supp. 1978). I t  has maintained the discretionary 
acts exception through case law. Hosea v. Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 678, 393 P.2d 967 (1964); 
Loger v. Washington Timber Prods., Inc., 8 Wash. App. 921, 509 P.2d 1009 (1973). North 
Carolina has waived sovereign immunity and has established the North Carolina Indus- 
trial Commission as a court to hear and determine tort claims against state agencies. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. $5 143-291 to 300.6 (1978). Arizona extinguished sovereign immunity in 
Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm., 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963). ARIZ. REV. STAT. 5  
12-821 (1956) provides the mechanism for filing negligence claims against the state and 
state entities. Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 
1227 (1977). 
For a general discussion of governmental immunity of state and local officials, see 57 
AM. JUR. 2d Negligence $ 5  54,79,91,243,321,322 (1971); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 11 (1958); 
Annot., 163 A.L.R. 1435 (1946); Annot., 120 A.L.R. 1376 (1939); Kovnat, Torts: Sover- 
eign and Governmental Immunity in New Mexico, 6 N.M.L. REV. 249 (1976); Comment, 
The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act: A Prescription for Regression, 49 DEN. L.J. 
567 (1973); Comment, The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act: A Judicial Challenge 
and the Legislative Response, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 449 (1972). 
213. UTAH CODE ANN. $8  63-48-1 to 7 (1953). 
214. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 5  24-10-110 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5  41-4-4 (1978); 
OR. REV. STAT. 5  30.285 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. $ 5  4.92.010-.I70 (1962 & Supp. 
1978). 
215. UTAH CODE ANN. 5  63-48-3(4) (1953). The law is similar in New Mexico in both 
respects. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 5  32-1-25, 41-4-4 (1978). 
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ble of precise definition,"' the very significant danger of sub- 
stantial harm to children from incarceration in adult jails may 
well qualify such confinement as gross negligence on the part of 
the officials responsible. 
Though humanitarians have warned for more than a cen- 
tury of its potential adverse effects, children are still incarcer- 
ated in adult jails throughout the United States. The promise of 
the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 
has been carried forward with only limited enforcement. While 
children sit in dark, dirty cells, the prey of nearby adult inmates, 
local and state officials complain about the shrinking tax base 
and the inconvenience of reassigning law officers for transporta- 
tion duties. 
In this unconscionable situation, children and their legal ad- 
vocates must press for vigorous enforcement of state and federal 
laws prohibiting the confinement of juveniles in adult jails. From 
the foregoing discussion, it is evident that local and state offi- 
cials, particularly sheriffs and county commissioners, are subject 
to lawsuits for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as dam- 
ages. The executive and legislative branches of government have 
contented themselves with an attitude of benign neglect. Only 
by bringing the flagrant abuses of children's rights to the atten- 
tion of the courts will children and their advocates effect mean- 
ingful and lasting change. 
216. See PROSSER, HANDBOOK F THE LAW OF TORTS 183-84 (4th ed. 1971). 
